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Abstract
The aim of this study is to show that, when examining social identification, it is both
possible and important to distinguish between self-categorisation, commitment to the
group, and group self-esteem, as related but separate aspects of group members’ social
identity. This was demonstrated in an experiment (N 119), in which Ingroup Status
(high/low), Ingroup Size (majority/minority), and Group Formation (self-selected/
assigned group membership) were manipulated orthogonally. The results of this study
confirm that these three aspects of social identity can be distinguished as separate
factors in a principal components analysis. Furthermore, as predicted, the three aspects
are dierentially related to manipulated group features, as well as displays of ingroup
favouritism. Group members’ self-categorisations were only aected by the relative size
of the group, while group self-esteem was only influenced by group status. Aective
commitment to the group depended both on group status and on the group assignment
criterion. Importantly, only the group commitment aspect of social identity mediated
displays of ingroup favouritism. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Although social identification plays a key role in social identity theory, relatively little
attention has been devoted to the question of how exactly this concept should be
defined theoretically, or how it can be measured empirically. Consequently, invest-
igations of social identity-related processes have often not systematically included
social identification as a dependent measure, have only measured it indirectly,
or merely inferred social identification from other responses such as intergroup
dierentiation. The main goal of this investigation is to take a closer look at the
conceptualisation and measurement of social identification, by trying to distinguish
between dierent aspects of social identification, relating these to specific group
features, and investigating them as mediators of social behaviour.
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At a theoretical level, the definition proposed by Tajfel (1978), which is most
commonly cited, maintains that social identity is ‘. . . that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group
(or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that
membership.’ (p. 63). On the basis of this definition, it is assumed that three com-
ponents may contribute to one’s social identity: a cognitive component (a cognitive
awareness of one’s membership in a social group—self-categorisation), an evaluative
component (a positive or negative value connotation attached to this group member-
ship—group self-esteem), and an emotional component (a sense of emotional involve-
ment with the group—aective commitment). The measurement scales that were
developed to tap identification with social group reflect this common conception,
as they all seem to incorporate the three components proposed in Tajfel’s definition
(see Ellemers & Mlicki, unpublished manuscript, for an overview). However, social
identification is usually treated as a unidimensional construct (cf. Ellemers, 1991). A
notable exception is a study by Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone and Crook (1989),
who distinguish three factors in the group identification scale developed by Brown,
Condor, Mathew, Wade and Williams (1986). Although Hinkle et al. (1989) argue in
favour of a multi-component conceptualisation of group identification, the
components they distinguish show substantial intercorrelations (between 0.43 and
0.58), which seems to have been taken as an indication that a common treatment as one
factor would be acceptable for practical purposes. More importantly, this imprecision
at the operational level is often reflected in conceptual treatments of social identity,
and has resulted in a considerable amount of theoretical confusion.
Empirical investigations of social identity have often studied how people respond to
artificially constructed or so-called minimal groups in experimental research para-
digms (see Brewer, 1979). Although it was demonstrated with this method that mere
categorisation can be sucient to induce people to behave in terms of their group
membership (cf. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), this is not necessarily the
case for members of natural groups. Indeed, it may be argued that in the minimal
group paradigm, the categorisation into dierent groups provides the only way for
people to make sense of the experimental situation. Hence, group aliation is the
only social cue that may be used to guide one’s behaviour towards other participants
(see also Jetten, Spears, &Manstead, 1996). However, in more natural social contexts,
people who acknowledge that they belong to a particular social category do not
necessarily feel committed to that group, or behave in terms of that group member-
ship. Instead, they might prefer to belong to another group, or simply be indierent to
this particular categorisation. Accordingly, it has been pointed out that seemingly
robust experimental phenomena such as the display of ingroup favouritism were
not consistently found as a consequence of mere categorisation into natural groups
(cf. Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992).
The key proposal of social identity theory, however, is that it is the extent to which
people identify with a particular social group that determines their inclination to
behave in terms of their group membership. In this sense, social identification is
primarily used to refer to a feeling of aective commitment to the group (i.e. the
emotional component), rather than the possibility to distinguish between members of
dierent social categories (the cognitive component). Therefore, as a first step we
think it is important to distinguish cognitive awareness of one’s group membership
per se (self-categorisation) from the extent to which one feels emotionally involved
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with the group in question (aective commitment).1 Indeed, there is recent empirical
evidence that people who belong to the same social group may show dierential
responses, depending on the extent to which they feel aectively committed to that
group (cf. Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers &
Van Rijswijk, 1997). Accordingly, it has also been demonstrated that self-stereotyping
(denoting a cognitive awareness of one’s group membership) can be distinguished
from aective commitment to the group (see Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) at the
measurement level, in the sense that they emerged as two separate clusters of items in
a principal components analysis.
A second respect in which we would like to specify our conceptualisation of ingroup
identification is by distinguishing the extent to which people feel emotionally involved
with their group (aective commitment) from the value connotation of that particular
group membership (group self-esteem). It has repeatedly been argued (cf. Tajfel &
Turner, 1979) and demonstrated (cf, Ellemers, 1993) that the two often covary, in the
sense that aective commitment tends to be stronger in more positively evaluated
groups (because these groups may contribute more to a positive social identity), while
people are inclined to distance themselves from less attractive groups. However, and
again this can be seen most clearly in the case of natural groups (when leaving the
group does not constitute an easy or attractive option), this does not imply that the two
necessarily go together, or that these concepts can be used interchangeably. Indeed,
recent empirical evidence clearly reveals that, provided their identity as members of a
distinct social group is suciently important, people may show signs of strong
emotional involvement while simultaneously acknowledging or even emphasizing the
negative characteristics of their group (see Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996).
In terms of our conceptual analysis, this implies that self-categorisation (the cogni-
tive component) as well as aective commitment to a specific group (the emotional
component) can be distinguished from group self-esteem derived from the value
connotation of that particular group membership (the evaluative component). More
importantly, we want to argue that this distinction should be made, to be able to
understand how they are aected dierentially by specific characteristics of the group
or the social context. Indeed, on the basis of previous theory and research it is possible
to hypothesize which group characteristics are most likely to aect the three dierent
components of identification. Furthermore, we predict that these components are
dierentially related to displays of ingroup favouritism in evaluative responses or
outcome allocations.
Relative status can be considered a central group characteristic in both theory and
research on social identity and intergroup relations. The general argument is that a
low group status position results in unfavourable comparisons between the ingroup
and relevant other groups, which may frustrate attempts to derive a positive social
identity from one’s group membership. As a result, members of lower status groups
are expected to show less social identification than members of groups with higher
status. Indeed, empirical investigations have confirmed that ingroup identification
is generally less in lower status groups than in groups with high status (Ellemers,
Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke,
1We have opted for the term ‘aective’ commitment because we aim to refer to a sense of emotional
involvement in the group, rather than the commitment that stems from interdependence or normative
considerations (see Allen & Meyer, 1990).
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1990; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987). However, in line with our previous analysis, we want
to argue that it is mainly the evaluative component of social identity (group self-
esteem), that is aected by relative group status. If this were indeed the case, this
would also help us understand inconsistent empirical findings with respect to the so-
called self-esteem hypothesis in social identity theory (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990;
Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Long & Spears, 1997). Essentially, the contradictory issue
seems to be that, on the one hand, members of lower-status groups are expected to
show ingroup favouritism as a means to boost their social identity. On the other hand,
to the extent that the current low status of their group results in low ingroup identifi-
cation, this should preclude them from undertaking such group-level behaviour.
However, if we assume that low group status negatively aects the evaluative compo-
nent of identification only, while the level of aective commitment (the emotional
component) can remain unchanged, it becomes clear that it is the combination of a
threat to group self-esteem and strong aective commitment which should elicit
attempts to depict the ingroup in a positive way.
A second important issue which has generated a substantial amount of empirical
research concerns the eects of relative group size on ingroup identification and
ingroup favouritism (e.g. Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Mummendey & Simon, 1989;
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Simon & Brown, 1987). Again, to date, the precise nature
of these eects has not been established unambiguously. We have argued elsewhere
that (seemingly) inconsistent results may have been obtained in previous research
because minority versus majority group membership has often been used to refer to
dierential status as well as dierential group size (see Ellemers & Van Rijswijk,
1997). However, when the two are disentangled, it turns out that minority group size
results in stronger ingroup identification than majority group size. Other than group
status eects, it seems that this is not due to the fact that membership in a minority
group is more attractive but because it is more salient or distinctive than majority
group membership (see McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire &
Padawer-Singer, 1976). Simon and Hamilton (1994) indicate that membership in a
small or distinctive group implies a relatively large overlap between the collective self
and the individual self. In a similar vein, from an optimal distinctiveness perspective
(see Brewer, 1991) it would seem that, compared to inclusion in a majority group,
minority group membership oers a better opportunity to balance the need to retain
some sense of individuality with the need to belong to a group, which should result in
a greater readiness to perceive or define oneself as a group member. Accordingly, we
would argue that it is mainly the cognitive component or self-categorisation aspect of
ingroup identification that is aected by relative ingroup size.
Finally, we aim to identify group characteristics which primarily influence the
emotional component of ingroup identification, that is, the extent to which people feel
aectively committed to a particular group. In our view, this component is essential as
this is supposed to constitute the main determinant of individual-level (such as
distancing oneself from the group) versus group-level responses (e.g. displays of
ingroup favouritism) to a common identity threat (see also Ellemers, Spears, &
Doosje, 1997). In relation to this issue, we argue that a fundamental distinction can be
made between assigned versus achieved (or self-selected) group memberships.
Although this distinction has been noted in the literature (e.g. Luhtanen & Crocker,
1991), neither in theoretical accounts nor in empirical work has systematic attention
been devoted to possible dierential responses to membership in these two kinds of
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groups. Nevertheless, from the original formulations of social identity theory (Tajfel,
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as well as from previous empirical work we may infer
that the nature of one’s group membership is likely to make a dierence.
In laboratory research (Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993) it has been
established that individuals who feel that their inclusion in a lower-status group is
unjust (but are nevertheless assigned to this group by the experimenter) are likely to
compete with their fellow ingroup members in order to leave this group, indicating
relatively little group commitment. In contrast, to the extent that people have
voluntarily committed themselves to membership in a particular group, they are more
inclined to show group solidarity, even when the group turns out to be unsuccessful
(see Turner, Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984). In a similar vein, Cio and Garner (1996)
have demonstrated that people who have actively applied for membership in a
particular group aremost likely to behave in accordance with their groupmembership.
Indeed, the observation that systematically dierent results are obtained with research
among natural versus artificial groups (see Mullen et al., 1992), may have to be
attributed to the fact that artificial groups are usually created by assigning people to
a particular experimental group, while a classification of research participants into
natural groups (e.g. according to their study major, university town, or political
aliation) is generally more likely to involve self-selected group memberships.
Accordingly, recent empirical evidence has demonstrated that dierent results
obtained with these two kinds of research paradigms can at least to some extent be
ascribed to the fact that the level of ingroup identification tends to be higher as a result
of natural compared to artificially created group memberships (Jetten et al., 1996).
We want to argue that this dierential group commitment essentially occurs
because of the basis on which people are included in a particular group (i.e. assigned
versus self-selected group memberships). Although in practice this distinction may
covary with the distinction between artificial and natural groups as we have argued
above, in our view this points to an empirical confound, rather than to a conceptually
necessary or inherent combination of features of these two kinds of groups. Indeed,
membership in some natural groups (such as gender groups or ethnic groups) is
assigned, rather than self-selected, while artificial groups for laboratory investigations
can also be created by letting participants choose or earn membership in a particular
group (cf. Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). In this study we will therefore
systematically vary the way in which participants are included in one of two
artificially created groups by either having the experimenter decide (assigned group
membership) or letting people indicate themselves to which of two groups they think
they belong (self-selected group membership).
To summarise the above argument, it seems both necessary and informative to
distinguish between dierent components of social identity as possible responses to
group membership and group features. The first aim of this study therefore is to
demonstrate that this is not only a possible conceptual distinction but that it can also
be made empirically. For this purpose, we will investigate how the three aspects of
social identity are dierentially aected by important group features, notably the
relative status and size of the group, and the basis of group formation (i.e. assigned
or self-selected group membership). Furthermore, we aim to assess whether the
three components of social identity play a dierent role as mediators of group-
level behaviour. Specifically, we predict that it is essentially a sense of emotional
involvement with the group (aective commitment), rather than the cognitive
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(self-categorisation) or evaluative (group self-esteem) component of ingroup identifi-
cation which predisposes people to show ingroup favouritism. In order to investigate
this, we manipulated the group assignment criterion (self-selected versus assigned
group membership), the relative size (minority versus majority) and status (high
versus low) of artificially created groups. In addition to measuring the three
components of social identity, we also included separate measures of personal self-
esteem and personal identity (a personal-level equivalent of commitment to the
group seems irrelevant), to investigate under what circumstances these measures at the
personal level show opposite or parallel results to the group-level measures (Turner,
1985).
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and nineteen students of the Free University in Amsterdam (51 men and
68 women) participated on a voluntary basis in this study. Their mean age was 22
(ranging from 18 to 59). In each session of the experiment, eight students participated.
They were randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions, with equal
proportions of male and female participants in each cell of the experimental design.
Each session of the experiment lasted about one hour. At the end of each session,
participants were fully debriefed and asked not to discuss the experiment with fellow
students. They were thanked for their participation, and received book tokens for the
amount of Hfl.10,-per person.
Procedure
Cover Story
Upon arrival, participants were placed in separate cubicles, and equipped with
personal computers, which were allegedly connected with each other. Instructions
about the experiment, and questions were displayed on the computer screen;
participants could respond by using the keyboard and mouse. First, participants were
asked to complete a questionnaire, in order to get acquainted with the computer
equipment (e.g. ‘I usually see more than one possible solution for problems I am
faced with; I sometimes have diculty seeing things from a broad perspective’). As a
cover story, it was subsequently explained that the experiment would investigate
people with dierent styles of problem solving, and more specifically, that inductive
thinkers would be compared to deductive thinkers (see Doosje, Spears, & Koomen,
1995). It was further explained that, at the individual level, both styles of problem
solving seemed equally eective. The alleged purpose of the present investigation
would be to find out whether groups of inductive or deductive thinkers would dier
with respect to their proficiency in problem solving. Therefore, it was necessary to
subdivide the participants into two groups, according to their individual problem-
solving style.
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Manipulation of Group Formation
In the assigned group condition, it was stated that the questionnaire participants had
completed at the outset of the experiment actually had measured their problem-
solving style. After providing participants with some further information about the
two styles of problem solving, they were allegedly subdivided into two groups, on the
basis of their problem-solving style. The label of the group in which participants were
placed (inductive or deductive) was counterbalanced. In the self-selected group
condition, participants also received further information about the two styles of
problem solving. However, in this condition, subjects could indicate for themselves
which style best described their own way of thinking. Accordingly, their membership
in the group of inductive thinkers or deductive thinkers was self-selected.2
Manipulation of Ingroup Size
Half of the participants were led to believe that their group was a majority group, half
supposedly ended up in a minority group. In the majority condition, the ingroup
allegedly consisted of five (of eight present) participants. Additionally it was stated
that the ingroup problem-solving style was generally found in 70% of the population.
In the minority condition, the ingroup was said to consist of three participants; in this
condition the ingroup problem-solving style was allegedly shared by 30 per cent of the
population.
Manipulation of Ingroup Status
After the two groups had been formed, participants were asked to complete a group
task consisting of 15 items, in order to find out which of the two groups was more
proficient at problem solving. For each item of this group task, participants were
presented with a series of four items (e.g. vacuum cleaner, mop, broom, dustpan), and
asked to indicate which item did not belong in the set. Then, participants were
allegedly shown the initial answers given by other members of their group (in fact,
these answers and the level of disagreement within the group were pre-programmed
and standardised for all participants). On the basis of this information, participants
could give their final answer; they were not informed about the final answers of their
fellow group members. After they had completed all 15 items in this way, participants
received (pre-programmed) feedback about the performance of the two groups. In the
high-status condition, the ingroup received a score of 82 points; the other group
2It turned out that the description of the deductive style of thinking was considered more attractive.
Accordingly, the majority (82 per cent) of participants in the self-selected group condition opted for the
deductive group. A possible consequence of this apparent dierence in attractiveness of the two groups
would be that, in the assigned group condition, participants would find it ‘worse’ to be assigned to the
inductive group than to the deductive group. However, additional analyses did not reveal that participants
who were assigned to the inductive group responded dierently from participants assigned to the deductive
group. Specifically, there was no significant eect of group label on either of the three components of social
identity (multivariate F(3,101) 1.02, ns, all univariate eects ns), or on personal identity/personal self-
esteem (multivariate F(2,102) 1.81, ns, both univariate eects ns). Therefore, we decided to maintain
assigned versus self-selected group membership (collapsed across group label) as a factor in the experi-
mental design.
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received 53 points. Additionally, participants were informed that the norm for
university students was 67 points. In the low-status condition, these scores were
reversed: the ingroup received 53 points and the outgroup 82 points; the norm score
was the same. Care was taken to assure participants that these scores had been
corrected for the number of group members: each group could gain a maximum of
100 points, regardless of the size of the group. Thus, it was explained that there was no
a priori advantage or disadvantage for the majority group or the minority group.
Checks on the Manipulations
After participants had received all the information regarding the manipulations, and
before they answered the dependent measures, three questions were asked to check
whether they had understood the manipulations in the intended way. Participants
were asked whether they were part of the group of inductive or deductive thinkers,
whether their group was a minority or a majority group, and whether their group’s
performance on the group task was superior or inferior to the performance of the
other group. Two participants did not indicate their group membership correctly;
they were not included in further analyses.
Dependent Variables
In this study, we intended to measure self-categorisation, commitment to the group,
and group self-esteem aspects of ‘social identity’, with 15 questions (e.g. ‘I identify with
other members of my group’). We further asked ten questions (see Table 2) to form
analogous measures at the individual level for personal identity and personal self-
esteem (a personal level equivalent of commitment to the group seems irrelevant).
These measures were partly selected and adapted on the basis of existing measures
(e.g. Brown, et al., 1986; Crocker&Luhtanen, 1990; Ellemers, 1993; Rosenberg, 1965),
and partly designed for the present study. All questions were answered on 7-point
scales, with 1 indicating ‘not at all’ and 7 ‘very much’. Additionally, participants rated
both groups on eight bipolar scales, four of which were related to the status defining
dimension (e.g. unintelligent–intelligent), and four were alternative dimensions
(e.g. dishonest–honest). These two sets of dimensions were included to oer partici-
pants in both group status conditions the opportunity to display ingroup favouritism
without violating consensual definitions of social reality (see Blanz, Mummendey, &
Otten, 1995; Ellemers, VanRijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997). Finally participants were
asked to independently allocate points to each group, that is, they could allocate zero to
100 points to their own group, and zero to 100 points to the other group.
RESULTS
Group Self-esteem, Self-categorisation, and Commitment to the Group
One of the main purposes of the present investigation was to see whether we could
distinguish between group self-esteem, self-categorisation and commitment to the
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group as three dimensions of social identity. Therefore, the 15 social identity items
were subjected to principal components analysis. Initial results revealed three inter-
pretable factors defined by ten items, while five items either loaded on more than one
factor, or did not load on any of these three factors. Therefore, only ten items were
retained for the final analyses. This revealed three factors with an Eigenvalue greater
than 1, which together account for 65 per cent of the variance in the separate
questions. The loadings of the separate questions on these three factors (after varimax
rotation), clearly indicate that three subsets of questions constitute three dierent
components (see Table 1).
The first factor is defined by four items reflecting the evaluative consequences of
group membership. Therefore, we will refer to this component as ‘group self-esteem’.
The second factor comprises three questions referring to the inclusion of the self in the
group, or self-definition as a group member. Hence, this component will be termed
‘self-categorisation’. The three questions with the highest loadings on the third factor
are related to group members’ desire to continue acting as a group member and are
therefore referred to as ‘commitment to the group’. In sum, this principal components
analysis confirms that we may distinguish between evaluative, cognitive, and aective
aspects of social identity, namely group self-esteem, self-categorisation, and commit-
ment to the group.
When we combine all social identity questions into one unweighted mean
score (alpha 0.82), a 2 (Ingroup Status) 2 (Ingroup Size) 2 (Group Formation)
analysis of variance reveals main eects of all three factors (Ingroup Status:
F(1,111) 21.52, p5 0.001, Ingroup Size: F(1,111) 4.92, p5 0.05, and Group
Formation: (F(1,111) 4.30, p5 0.05). The relevant means indicate that overall social
identity was higher in the High Status condition (M 5.15) than in the Low Status
condition (M 4.44), it was higher in the Minority condition (M 5.01) than in the
Majority condition (M 4.61), and it was higher when the group is Self-selected
(M 4.99) than when group membership is Assigned (M 4.68). Additionally, there
was a marginally significant interaction of Ingroup Size and Group Formation
(F(1,111) 3.79, p5 0.054), which qualifies the latter two main eects. The relevant
Table 1. Loadings of three aspects of social identity on three factors (after varimax rotation)
Factor
1 2 3
Group self-esteem
I think my group has little to be proud of 0.70 0.32 ÿ0.06
I feel good about my group 0.63 0.37 0.36
I have little respect for my group 0.77 0.15 0.27
I would rather not tell that I belong to this group 0.66 ÿ0.28 0.26
Self-categorisation
I identify with other members of my group 0.14 0.80 0.19
I am like other members of my group 0.11 0.82 0.09
My group is an important reflection of who I am 0.06 0.61 0.27
Commitment to the group
I would like to continue working with my group 0.16 0.31 0.72
I dislike being a member of my group 0.24 0.19 0.76
I would rather belong to the other group 0.14 0.09 0.88
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means indicate that social identity was lower for participants whowere Assigned to the
Majority group (M 4.36), than participants for whom the Majority group was Self-
selected (M 4.97), or participants in the Minority conditions (M 5.01 in both
Group Formation conditions).
However, as we have argued in the introduction, the main reason to distinguish
between these three aspects of social identity is that they are expected to be dier-
entially aected by specific group characteristics, and that a further specification of
these eects may help us understand seemingly inconsistent findings that are reported
in the literature. In order to investigate whether the predicted relations can indeed
be established, we included the three orthogonal (standardised) factor scores in a
2 (Ingroup Status) 2 (Ingroup Size) 2 (Group Formation)MANOVA.3 As was the
case with the overall mean score, this revealed multivariate significant main eects
of Ingroup Status (F(3,109) 8.60, p5 0.001), of Ingroup Size (F(3,109) 2.99,
p5 0.05), and Group Formation (F(3,109) 4.59, p5 0.01). However, when we look
at the univariate eects of the three factors, the picture becomes more dierentiated. It
turns out that the eect of Ingroup Status was only significant for the group self-esteem
factor (F(1,111) 5.74, p5 0.05), and the commitment factor (F(1,111) 16.09,
p5 0.001). As predicted, group self-esteem was higher in the High Status condition
(M 0.21) than in the Low Status condition (Mÿ0.23). Furthermore, group
members felt more strongly committed to the High Status group (M 0.34) than to
the Low Status group (Mÿ0.37). In contrast, the Ingroup Size eect was only
significant for the self-categorisation factor (F(1,111) 8.58, p5 0.01). In line with
our theoretical argument, participants self-categorised stronger as members of a
Minority group (M 0.27) than as members of a Majority group (Mÿ0.27).
Finally, at the univariate level the Group Formation eect was only significant for the
commitment factor (F(1,111) 11.45, p5 0.001), supporting our prediction that
participants would feel more committed to a Self-selected group (M 0.33), than to
an Assigned group (Mÿ0.24). This main eect was qualified by a marginally
significant interaction of Group Formation with Ingroup Size (F(1,111) 2.94,
p5 0.09), indicating that the Group Formation eect was more pronounced in the
Majority condition (M(Self-selected) 0.43; M(Assigned)ÿ0.42) than in the
Minority Condition (M(Self-selected) 0.22; M(Assigned)ÿ0.05).
Personal Identity and Personal Self-esteem
The ten questions intended to measure personal self-esteem and personal identity
were first subjected to a principal components analysis to investigate whether the
intended self-esteem and identity components could also be distinguished at the
personal level. This resulted in a two-factorial solution, which accounts for 62% of
the variance in the separate items. Furthermore, as the loadings on the two factors
indicate, the varimax rotated factor solution revealed the intended subdivision into
items related to self-esteem and items related to personal identification (see Table 2).
The first factor is clearly defined by seven questions tapping the evaluative aspect of
people’s self-image, and is therefore termed ‘personal self-esteem’. The second factor
comprises three questions focusing on the self-definition as a unique individual, and is
3The analysis of unweighted mean scores yields virtually identical eects.
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hence referred to as ‘personal identification’. As we did at the group level, we subjected
the resulting factor scores to a 2 (Ingroup Status) 2 (Ingroup Size) 2 (Group
Formation) MANOVA. This revealed a multivariate eect of Ingroup Size
(F(2,110) 2.56, p5 0.08), which was significant at the univariate level for the
personal identification factor (F(1,111) 4.44, p5 0.05). The relevant means indicate
that participants showed stronger personal identification in the Minority condition
(M 0.20) than when they belonged to a Majority group (Mÿ0.19). Furthermore,
there was a multivariate interaction of Ingroup Status and Group Formation
(F(2,110) 2.47, p5 0.09), as well as a multivariate interaction of Ingroup Size,
Ingroup Status and Group Formation (F(2,110) 3.54, p5 0.05). At the univariate
level both these eects were only significant for the personal self-esteem factor
(F(1,111) 4.51, p5 0.04 and F(1,111) 6.67, p5 0.02, respectively). When we look
at the relevant means (see Table 3), it turns out that the group formation criterion did
not aect personal self-esteem for members of high status groups. With low ingroup
status, participants for whom membership in this group was self-selected showed
lower personal self esteem than participants who were assigned to the group. This
eect is qualified by the three-way interaction, which reveals that the interaction
Table 2. Loadings of personal level questions on two factors (after varimax-rotation)
Factor
1 2
Personal self-esteem
I have got what it takes 0.75 0.12
I think I have sucient qualities 0.82 0.23
I generally feel like a failure 0.80 0.09
I can do most things just as well as others 0.71 0.07
I have nothing to be proud of 0.74 0.21
I feel good about myself 0.83 0.08
I am generally satisfied about myself 0.75 ÿ0.09
Personal identification
I see myself as someone with individual characteristics 0.34 0.49
I am dierent from other people ÿ0.09 0.88
I feel like a unique person 0.12 0.84
Table 3. Means relevant to the two-way and three-way interactions for the personal self-
esteem factor
Group formation
Self-selected Assigned
Ingroup status
High ÿ0.02 ÿ0.08
Low ÿ0.36 0.36
Majority size Minority size
Self-selected Assigned Self-selected Assigned
Ingroup status
High 0.22 ÿ0.25 ÿ0.25 0.09
Low ÿ0.82 0.45 0.10 0.26
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between ingroup status and group formation was only significant in majority
(F(1,111) 10.99, p5 0.001) but not in minority groups (F(1,111)5 1, ns). Thus, the
dierence in self-esteem ratings between self-selected and assigned members of low
status groups was caused by the majority condition, which implies that participants’
personal self-esteem was lowest when their membership in a low-status majority
group was self-selected, instead of assigned.
Group Ratings
The group ratings on eight evaluative dimensions were first combined into unweighted
mean scores for the ingroup (alpha 0.82) and the outgroup (alpha 0.83). Then a
dierentiation score was calculated, by subtracting the average outgroup rating from
the ingroup rating. This evaluative dierentiation score was subjected to a 2 (Ingroup
Status) 2 (Ingroup Size) 2 (Group Formation) analysis of variance. This first
revealed that the overall mean dierentiation deviates significantly from zero
(F(1,111) 15.26, p5 0.001), indicating that group members generally favoured
the ingroup over the outgroup (M 0.29). However, the Ingroup Status main eect
(F(1,111) 13.72, p5 0.001), indicates that ingroup favouritism was only displayed
by members of the High Status (M 0.57) rather than the Low Status (Mÿ0.02)
Ingroup.4 Additionally, a two-way interaction of Ingroup Size and Group Formation
(F(1,111) 4.94, p5 0.05) emerged. Inspection of the relevant means (see Table 4)
and analysis of simple main eects reveals that the overall tendency to display ingroup
favouritism in evaluative ratings did not emerge among participants who were
assigned to a majority ingroup. Specifically, these group members were less inclined to
show ingroup favouring evaluations than participants for whom majority group
membership was self-selected (F(1,111) 7.23, p5 0.01), or participants who were
assigned to a minority group (F(1,111) 4.10, p5 0.05).
Table 4. Means relevant to the interaction of Ingroup Size
and Group Formation on evaluative ingroup favouritism
Group formation Ingroup size
Majority Minority
Self-selected 0.56b 0.29b
Assigned ÿ0.00a 0.39b
(Only means with a dierent superscript deviate significantly from each
other at p5 0.05).
4When we distinguish ratings on four ‘competence-related’ dimensions (competent, intelligent, good,
motivated; alpha ingroup: 0.81; alpha outgroup: 0.80) from four ‘alternative’ dimensions (critical, honest,
rational, close-knit; alpha ingroup: 0.71; alpha outgroup: 0.68), it turns out that the status main eect was
caused by a reflection of the status manipulation on the competence related dimensions (High Status
M 0.85; Low Status Mÿ0.32; F(1,111) 31.91, p5 0.001), while ingroup favouritism was displayed
regardless of relative group status on the alternative dimensions (High Status M 0.27; Low Status
M 0.30, F(1,111)5 1, ns). This is consistent with findings in previous investigations that studied
intergroup dierentiation on competence related and alternative dimensions (cf. Blanz, Mummendey, &
Otten, 1995; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997). However, a similar two-way interaction of Group Status and
Group Formation emerged on both subsets of dimensions. For our present purposes, we are more
interested in general patterns of intergroup dierentiation. Therefore, and because a dierence between the
competence related and alternative dimensions only occurred with respect to the status main eect, we
decided to retain the overall mean dierentiation score for further analysis.
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Outcome Allocation
We calculated an outcome dierentiation measure, by subtracting the number of
points allocated to the ingroup (0–100) from the points (0–100) allocated to the
outgroup, and subjected this measure to a 2 (Ingroup Status) 2 (Ingroup Size) 2
(Group Formation) analysis of variance. The significant deviation of the overall mean
score from zero (F(1,111) 5.88, p5 0.05), indicates that participants were generally
inclined to favour their ingroup in outcome allocations (M 2.87). Additionally, an
Ingroup Status main eect emerged (F(1,111) 62.61, p5 0.001), indicating that
High Status group members favoured the ingroup (M 11.03), while Low Status
group members tended to acknowledge the status dierence in their outcome
allocations, by favouring the outgroup (Mÿ6.02).
Ingroup Favouritism and Identification
In order to investigate the relation between identification and ingroup favouritism, we
first conducted correlational analyses. As can be seen in Table 5, dierentiation in
evaluative ratings as well as outcome allocations is significantly correlated with social
identification, and is not related to personal identification or personal self-esteem (the
dierent components of social identity alsowere unrelated to personal identification or
personal self-esteem, with non-significant correlations ranging from ÿ0.20 to 0.20).
This is in line with general predictions from social identity theory, as well as previous
empirical findings. However, when we take a closer look at the three dierent compo-
nents of social identity, it turns out that self-categorisation (the cognitive component)
does not contribute to either form of dierentiation. Group self-esteem (the evaluative
component) shows a moderate relation with the two intergroup dierentiation
measures, and as predicted only aective commitment (the emotional component) is
reliably correlated with displays of ingroup favouritism on both measures.
We further investigated the relation between social identification and ingroup
favouritism by performing mediational analyses. Specifically, we explored whether
the three components of social identification would dierentially emerge as predictors
of ingroup favouritism, and investigated whether inclusion of these covariates might
(partly) account for eects of the independent variables on displays of ingroup
favouritism. The analysis of covariance for the evaluative dierentiation measure
revealed a significant eect of the regression (F(3,108) 3.41, p5 0.05). Of the three
Table 5. Correlations between social identity, personal identity, and dierentiation in
evaluations and outcome allocations
Evaluative dierentiation Outcome dierentiation
General social identity 0.39* 0.42*
Group self-esteem 0.20 0.23*
Self-categorisation 0.10 0.10
Group commitment 0.38* 0.40*
Personal self-esteem 0.06 0.09
Personal identity 0.21 0.00
Except the general social identity measure, these are all standardized scores. Significant correlations
(p5 0.01) are marked with an asterisk (*).
Self-categorisation 383
Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 371–389 (1999)
components, only group commitment contributed significantly to the explanation of
the variance in ingroup favouritism (beta 0.25, t 2.71, p5 0.01), while group self-
esteem (beta 0.17, t 1.83, ns) and self-categorisation (beta 0.08, t5 1, ns) did
not emerge as significant predictors. Furthermore, the eect of Ingroup Status in the
analysis of variance (F(1,111) 13.72, p5 0.001) was substantially reduced in the
analysis of covariance (F(1,108) 4.17, p5 0.05), and the two-way interaction
between Ingroup Size and Group Assignment that emerged in the analysis of variance
(F(1,111) 4.94, p5 0.05), was no longer significant after inclusion of the social
identity components as covariates (F(1,108) 2.49, ns). From these analyses we may
conclude that our theoretical prediction is corroborated, in the sense that only the
group commitment component of social identity reliably mediates evaluative
intergroup dierentiation.
In a similar vein, we assessed the mediating eects of the three social identity com-
ponents on outcome dierentiation. Again, the regression was significant in the
analysis of covariance (F(3,108) 3.34, p5 0.05), and group commitment was the
only significant predictor of ingroup favouritism in outcome allocations (beta 0.27,
t 2.87, p5 0.01), while group self-esteem (beta 0.14, t 1.52, ns) and self-
categorisation (beta 0.06 t5 1, ns) did not emerge as significant covariates. As was
the case with evaluative dierentiation, the main eect of Ingroup Status that emerged
in the analysis of variance (F(1,111) 62.61, p5 0.001) was substantially reduced in
the analysis of covariance (F(1,108) 35.60, p5 0.001).5 Again, this indicates that
only the group commitment component of social identity mediates intergroup dier-
entiation in outcome allocation.
DISCUSSION
The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether the theoretical distinction
between three dierent components of social identity may help us understand why
specific group characteristics aect reported levels of social identification. Further-
more, we wanted to establish the role each of the three aspects plays as a cause
for people to behave in terms of their group membership (i.e. to display ingroup
favouritism). As we have demonstrated, the ‘traditional’ consideration of the three
components as related aspects of a single theoretical construct (which indeed seems
acceptable in terms of the internal consistency of the overall scale) appears to indicate
that relative ingroup size, relative ingroup status, and the group formation criterion all
aect the extent to which people identify as a member of their group, which is
consistent with previous research. However, in our view, why this is the case can only
be understood when we disentangle the three components that are contained in the
most commonly used definition of social identity (Tajfel, 1978).
5When only group commitment was included as a covariate in the analysis of variance, similar results are
obtained. For the evaluative dierentiation, again the regression was significant (F(1,110) 6.20, p5 0.05;
beta 0.23, t 2.49, p5 0.05), the eect of Ingroup Status was substantially reduced to (F(1,110) 7.05,
p5 0.01), and the two-way interaction between Ingroup Size and Group Assignment was no longer
significant (F(1,110) 3.41, ns). For outcome dierentiation the regression was significant (F(1,110)
7.29, p5 0.01; beta 0.25, t 2.70, p5 0.01), and the main eect of Ingroup Status was reduced
(F(1,110) 44.10, p5 0.001).
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As predicted, group self-esteem (that is, the evaluative aspect of social identity) is
only aected by the relative status of the ingroup, while the extent to which people self-
categorize as group members (the cognitive aspect) solely depends on the relative size
of the ingroup. Furthermore, it turns out thatminority groupmembers simultaneously
report strong self-categorisation as group members and strong personal identification.
This is in line with Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory as well as Simon’s
analysis (Simon &Brown, 1987; Simon&Hamilton, 1994), who both argue that social
and personal identities can be more easily reconciled in minority rather than majority
groups. For our present argument it is important to note that relative ingroup size only
aects self-categorisation, but not group self-esteem. This may help us understandwhy
strong group identification can be observed among minority group members, even
if this may seem unfavourable in terms of the value connotation of their group
membership (see also Ellemers, & Van Rijswijk, 1997). In a more general sense, this
corroborates our argument that the two components are relatively independent of each
other, which implies that a threat to group self-esteem does not necessarily lead people
to avoid self-categorisation in terms of that particular group membership, or vice
versa.
Aective commitment to the group (the emotional aspect of social identification)
turns out to depend both on the way groups have been formed and on the relative
status of these groups. Thus, group commitment is enhanced when people have self-
selected their group membership, or when the group turns out to have relatively high
status. It is important to note that these two main eects occur independently of each
other. This implies that even when a particular group has low status, people may show
relatively strong group commitment when their membership in this group was self-
selected rather than externally imposed (cf. Turner et al., 1984). Furthermore, it
turned out that the reluctance to feel emotionally involved with an assigned group
membership is exacerbated when the group in question constitutes a majority, which
does not oer the opportunity to distinguish oneself as a distinct individual, as we
have argued above. Indeed, an externally imposed membership in a majority group
not only resulted in the lowest level of group commitment but also led people to
refrain from showing ingroup favouritism in evaluative group ratings. Thus, it seems
that the independent eects of dierent group characteristics may reinforce each other
when combined, which is also evident from our observation that personal self-esteem
is lowest for those who have self-selected their membership in a low status majority
group.
In our theoretical analysis we argued, in line with social identity theory, that group
commitment is the main aspect of social identity that aects people’s tendency to
behave in terms of their group membership. Indeed, we referred to the inconsistent
findings with respect to the relation between group status and ingroup favouritism, to
argue that while low group status may reliably threaten group self-esteem, the display
of ingroup favouritism (i.e. showing a group-level response to such threat) depends on
the extent to which people feel committed to the group. When we look at the results
we obtained with respect to ingroup favouritism, it turns out that people are most
inclined to favour the ingroup (both in terms of evaluative ratings and outcome
allocations) when it has relatively high status. In contrast, members of lower status
groups tend to acknowledge this state of aairs in their group ratings and outcome
allocations. A similar pattern of results has been observed in previous studies
(e.g. Blanz et al., 1995; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997; Ellemers et al., 1997), where it
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was explained by arguing that consensual definitions of social reality may restrict the
extent to which lower-status group members feel free to claim ingroup superiority on
evaluative dimensions or feel justified to favour their group in outcome allocations. In
fact, such reality constraints have been cited as one possible reason why lower status
group members may refrain from showing ingroup favouritism (Hinkle & Brown,
1990), while they may nevertheless be motivated to perceive (and depict) their group
in a positive way.
More relevant to our present argument, however, is the way in which these displays
of ingroup favouritism are related to the three components of social identity. First, it is
important to note that ingroup favouritism can indeed be considered a group-level
response to the social situation, in the sense that (contrary to what is suggested by
Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987) ingroup favouritism is only related
to people’s social identity, and not to their personal identity or personal self-esteem.
Furthermore, when we dierentiate between the three components of social identity,
analyses of covariance corroborate our theoretical prediction. It turns out that only
the group commitment aspect of social identity reliably mediates displays of ingroup
favouritism on evaluative and allocation measures. As we have argued in the intro-
duction, this may help us understand the seemingly contradictory finding that low
group status may result in decreased social identification on the one hand, but in
increased ingroup favouritism on the other hand. The results of the present investi-
gation enable us to specify that although low group status may negatively aect both
group self-esteem as well as group commitment (i.e. the evaluative and the emotional
components of social identity), other independent group characteristics (such as the
group formation criterion) may in turn reinforce a sense of aective involvement with
one’s group (the emotional component). Importantly, only the group commitment
aspect of social identity mediates the tendency to behave in terms of one’s group
membership, albeit that the way this is expressed can be constrained by social reality,
as we have seen above.
An important aim of the present study was to disentangle the three components of
social identity, as well as the role they play as mediators of social behaviour. In line
with our analysis based on original formulations of social identity theory, group
commitment appears to be the key aspect of social identity which drives the tendency
for people to behave in terms of their group membership. Furthermore, we established
that, compared to an assigned group aliation, people tend to feel more committed to
self-selected (or achieved) group memberships, and this dierential group commit-
ment emerges relatively independently of other group features, such as its relative
status. As far as we know, the present study is the first in which this dierence between
assigned versus self-selected group memberships is studied experimentally. Indeed,
although we would argue that processes similar to those observed here may be
responsible for previously documented dierences in responses between members of
natural and artificially created social groups, this has so far not been systematically
established. Consequently, we feel that future research should be sensitive to possible
eects of such features of social groups.More generally, the results of the present study
underline that, in order to understand the psychological processes involved, it is
essential to aim for more conceptual precision in theory and research on intergroup
relations.
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